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THE RULE IN KENTUCKY AS TO SURFACE WATER
Tiffany has defined surface water as follows: 'Water spread
upon the surface of land, or contained in depressions therein, if not
flowing in a fixed channel, or not having permanent sources of sup-
ply, so as to constitute a watercourse, and not constituting a per-
manent lake or pond, is known as 'surface water.' Waters of that
character include such as come from rains and snows, do not be-
long to a well defined body of water or natural stream, but are con-
fined partly to the surface and partly beneath the surface in swamps
or sloughs where they lie stagnant and inactive."'
The term watercourse is sometimes used loosely so as to in-
clude depressions of the nature of ravines and gullies. Technically,
however, these are not watercourses. Water coming naturally into,
and flowing through depressions is entirely surface water. On the
other hand, a watercourse has a more permanent source of supply
than this. Although a watercourse may carry surface water, this is
not its only source. Thus, a river is a watercourse but ravines and
gullies are not. According to Webster's International Dictionary the
legal definition of a watercourse is: "A watercourse may be dry
during unusual droughts, but the term does not apply to a stream de-
pending for its flow merely upon surface drainage." Therefore,
watercourses are not under consideration in this note.
There are two principal rules in the United States relative to
rights in surface water; the common law rule- and that of the civil
law.
The common law rule, in theory, although such is here not
averred to be the fact, might well have been based on the maxim:
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, (the owner of the soil
owns to the sky). This is mentioned to show the concept of total
right of anything on the soil to him who owns the soil. That is,
the owner can use anything of nature on his land in any manner
and to whatever extent, for it is his absolutely. Generally, by the
common law rule, the owner of the soil might use it or make any
alterations thereon regardless of the effect such use or alterations
would have on the flow of surface water.' In fact, this maxim seems
to have been the basis upon which the common law rule was ap-
plied in the case of Gannon v. Hargadon.' There, after stating this
maxim, Chief Justice Bigelow remarked: "A party may improve
any portion of his land, although. he may thereby cause the sur-
ITIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 740, p. 155.
2 TiFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 743, p. 165, n. 21: "This is a
misnomer, since there appears never to have been any direct decision
on the subject in England." See Notes (1908) 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 155,
(1913) 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 792.
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (New Abr. ed. 1940) sec. 513, p. 511.
'92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865).
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face water thereon, whencesoever it may come, to pass off in larger
quantities than previously. If such an act causes damage to adjacent
land, it is damnum absque injuria." I This case is an example of
the unqualified application of the common law rule. However, the
rule has not always been so applied. Some jurisdictions have quali-
fied it so that surface water may be interfered with without liability
as long as such interference is within the course of reasonable use
by the owner of his land, and so as not to cause injury to another
unreasonably, negligently, or without necessity.
6
The civil law rule, on the other hand, suggests kinship to,
though it is not suggested that it has its origin in, or is based upon,
the maxim: aqua currit, et debet currere ut currere solebat exjure
nature, (water runs and ought to run as it is by natural law ac-
customed to run). By this rule the owner of the upper or dominant
estate has no right to interfere with the natural flow of surface
water onto the lower estate which is subject to the servitude of re-
ceiving it from the upper estate.'
The scope of this note is to confine consideration to the rule
that is applied in Kentucky. As to rural property, the lower pro-
prietor may sometimes erect an obstruction, such as a dam, to pro-
tect his land from water draining through a natural depression,
which water has been increased by artificial drainage by the
upper proprietor. However, he will not be allowed to maintain the
obstruction if some of the water in the depression is naturalli flow-
ing surface water. Under such circumstances the lower proprietor
would inevitably, at some time or other, obstruct naturally flow-
ing surface water. In such a case the upper proprietor will be re-
quired to desist from artificial drainage and the lower proprietor
will be required to remove the obstruction This is because the civil
law rule will not allow the upper proprietor to increase the natural
flow of surface water to the detriment of the lower proprietor,
nor the latter to obstruct it so that it will back upon the upper
estate.' Railroads, for example, are liable where they erect em-
bankments without maintaining proper culverts for escape of sur-
face water, and such water is caused to back upon and damage the
land of adjacent owners."'
In some states the civil law rule permits an exception in favor
of urban land in order to afford opportunity for improvements
'Id. at 110.
Baker v. Allen, 66 Ark. 271, 50 S.W. 511 (1899); Hume v. Des
Moines, 146 Iowa 624, 125 N. W. 846 (1910); Werner v. Popp, 94
Minn. 118, 102 N. W. 366 (1905); Shaw v. Ward, 131 Wis. 646, 111
N. W. 671 (1907).
"TIFANY, loc. cit. supra n. 3.
'Stone v. Ashurst, 258 Ky. 687, 149 S. W. 2d 4 (1941); Grinstead
v. Sanders, 22 Ky. L. R. 51, 56 S. W. 665 (1900).
' White v. Howe, 238 Ky. 108, 168 S.W. 2d 28 (1942); Hutchinson
v. Copenhaver, 193 Ky. 301, 235 S.W. 761 (1921).
Madisonville, H. & E. R. R. v. Cates, 138 Ky. 257, 127 S.W. 988
(1910); Louisville & N. R. v. Hodge, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 141 (1869).
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thereon. Thus, some alterations in the land, though interfering
with the natural flow of surface water, are permitted." Kentucky,
however, applies the civil law rule to urban as well as to rural land,
and denies the right to both the upper owner,a and the lower
owner,' to obstruct the natural flow of surfact water even when
making improvements. Thus, if water drains onto the defendant's
lower land through a depression that extends from the plaintiff's
land through the defandant's lower land, the latter cannot, legally,
fill in the depression as a building site or for any other beneficial
purpose. This is true for the reason that in so doing, the defendant
would violate the plaintiff's easement to have the water from his
estate flow naturally and without obstruction onto the land of the
defendant. Conversely, the upper owner cannot,legally,obstruct
water that flows from his estate onto a lower estate. This seems to
be a serious objection for it discourages making improvements, and
especially so, if the rule is applied unqualifiedly. No doubt, those
states which except urban property from the rule, have seen the
apparent superiority of the common law rule in encouraging the
making of improvements.
The question sometimes arises as to whether an upper pro-
prietor may discharge surface water by artificial means, such as
ditches, into a water course instead of allowing it to reach such
stream by natural drainage. The view in Kentucky seems to be
that this is permissible if the watercourse is not thereby so in-
creased in volume as to exceed its natural capacity to the point of
overflowing the land of the lower proprietor.' Generally, an owner
will be liable for resulting damage if, by artificial means, water is
cast in greater volume and quantities upon the land of another than
would naturally drain thereon."
Though the servitude of the lower estate subjects that estate
to receive the natural flow of water from the upper estate, the
I TiFFAxy, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 743, p. 167.
"Moody v. Fremd, 177 Ky. 5, 197 S.W. 433 (1917) (right of
upper proprietor to maintain barrier may be gained by prescription,
fifteen years); see Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 125 Ky. 213, 226,
100 S. W. 873, 876 (1907).
'Watson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 238 Ky. 31, 36 S.W. 2d 641
(1931) (qualifies rule by not allowing plaintiff to recover for dam-
ages he could have avoided by ordinary care and reasonable ex-
pense); Dugan v. Long, 234 Ky. 511, 28 S.W. 2d 765 (1930); Johnson
v. Marcum, 152 Ky. 629, 153 S.W. 959 (1913); Pickerill v. City of
Louisville, 125 Ky. 213, 100 S.W. 873 (1907). Contra: Middlesborough
Town Co. v. Helwig, 14 Ky. L. R. 430 (1892) (denies recovery on
basis that filling a marshy lot was not obstruction of a watercourse).
"'Smith v. Wathen, 156 Ky. 820, 162 S.W. 88 (1914); Jones v.
Bower, 32 Ky. L. R. 450, 105 S.W. 1189 (1907); Finley v. City of
Williamsburg, 24 Ky. L. R. 1336, 71 S.W. 502 (1902); Newport News
& M. V. Co. v. Wilson, 16 Ky. L. R. 262 (1894).
'Frank v. Dierson, 235 Ky. 229, 30 S.W. 2d 950 (1930); Steinke
v. North Vernon Lumber Co., 190 Ky. 231, 227 S.W. 274 (1921);
Louisville & N. R. v. Stephens, 188 Ky. 1, 220 S.W. 746 (1920); Bonte
-v. Postel, 109 Ky. 64, 58 S.W. 536 (1900).
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lower proprietor is under no duty. to keep a ditch open to receive
and facilitate the flow. = Thus, if water flows from the upper land
to a ditch on the lower land, which ditch is on the upper side of the
lower proprietor's right of way, and the ditch does not suffice, or
becomes clogged, there is no liability for the consequent stoppage."
The reason for this is that the upper proprietor's easement to have
his water flow on the lower land may be limited by the nature of
that land.
In a few cases there has been presented what appears to be a
qualified application of the civil law rule. In some of these cases
where the lower land had been overflowed by the upper proprie-
tor's interfering with the flow of surface water, the lower pro-
prietor was held to be under a duty to minimize damages by ordi-
nary care and reasonable expense."' This is equivalent to saying
that the upper proprietor by interfering with the flow of surface
water may overflow the land of the lower proprietor and will not
be liable for damages which by ordinary care and reasonable ex-
pense, the lower proprietor could have avoided. In two cases in-
volving railroads, the rule seems to have been qualified by basing
liability upon negligence in flooding another's premises.'
The civil law rule might well be qualified in Kentucky to per-
mit reasonable interference with surface water. Such qualification
would encourage the making of improvements. The advantage of
not being injured by another's treating surface water as a "com-
mon enemy," to be gotten rid of regardless of the effect on others,
would still be retained. There is authority for qualifying the rule
in the jurisdictions that have allowed improvements in urban prop-
erty, even though the civil law rule was in force in that state. A
few Kentucky cases have shown a tendency in that direction. At
least the rule should not be applied rigidly. In so doing undue
hardships will obviously result. To qualify the civil law rule is to
point the way in placing surface water in the category of other
classes of water in which the "reasonable use" rule is applied.
Where interests conflict, the extent of the respective rights of the
parties cannot better be determined than by putting the exercise of
the rights to the test of reasonableness.
ARNETT TMANN-, r
Robertson v. Daviess Gravel Rd. Co., 116 Ky. 913, 77 S.W. 189
(1913).
"Johnson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 208 Ky. 143, 270 S.W. 726
(1925).
18 Watson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 238 Ky. 31, 36 S.W. 2d 641
(1931); Johnson v. Ratliff, 233 Ky. 187, 25 S.W. 2d 355 (1930);
Raleigh v. Clark, 114 Ky. 732, 71 S.W. 857 (1903); see Walter v. Wag-
ner, 225 Ky. 255, 257, 8 S.W. 2d 421, 422 (1928).
" Madisonville, H. & E. R. R. v. Thomas, 148 Ky. 131, 146 S.W. 33
(1912) (must maintain culverts if it could be done by reasonable
expense); Madisonville, H. & E. R. R. v. Renfro, 127 S.W. 508 (1910)
(liability of railroad dependent on negligence).
